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In this paper I discuss Hilary Putnam’s view of the conditions that 
need to be fulfilled for a speaker to successfully defer to a 
linguistic community for the meaning of a word she uses. In the 
first part of the paper I defend Putnam’s claim that knowledge of 
what he calls “stereotypes” is a requirement on linguistic 
competence. In the second part of the paper I look at two 
consequences that this thesis has. One of them concerns the choice 
between two competing formulations of consumerist semantics. 
The other concerns the notion of deference, and in particular the 
question whether deference can be non-intentional. Although the 
standard view is that deference is intentional, it has also been 
argued (Stojanovic et al. 2005) that most common forms of 
deference are not. I argue that deference is best understood as 
intentional, given the possibility of failures of deference. Cases in 
which the requirement that the speaker know the stereotypes 
associated with a particular word is not fulfilled are examples of 
unsuccessful attempts to defer. !
Keywords: deference, Putnam, stereotypes, intention, default 
deference !!!
1. Introduction !
Semantic externalism, broadly conceived, is usually understood as a 
meta-semantic, or presemantic (Almog 1984, 482), account of natural 
language. In Robert Stalnaker’s (1997, 535) words, semantic externalism 
is a foundational, as opposed to a descriptive, theory of meaning. The 
aim of a descriptive semantic theory is to characterize the meaning of 
certain expressions. The aim of a foundations theory is to give an account 
of the facts that need to obtain in order for those expressions to have the 
meaning that they have. According to Stalnaker, a foundational theory  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tells “what it is about the capacities, customs, practices, or mental states 
of a speaker or community of speakers that makes it the case that an 
expression has the semantic value that it has” (Stanlaker 1997, 542). 
The paradigmatic externalist view concerning proper names, as 
formulated by Saul Kripke (1980) in his causal picture of reference, 
explains why proper names have the referent they have by appeal to three 
kinds of facts: 1) an initial baptism, in which the name is associated to the 
individual it is meant to name; 2) a chain of uses that preserves the 
reference over time; 3) and finally, certain facts about the way the 
speakers use the name (in particular, the intention with which they utter 
the word). 
These meta-semantic considerations have been extended to natural kind 
terms such as ‘water’ and physical magnitude terms such as ‘temperature’ 
in Kripke (1980), Putnam (1975), Devitt (1981) and others. The idea is 
that the reference of these terms is fixed by mechanisms that have a 
social and historical dimension, in ways that are analogous in important 
respects with the case of proper names. Moreover, as Joseph Almog 
argued, the externalist considerations are even wider in scope. 
Externalism about proper names sets the basis for a socio-historical 
theory of linguistic meaning, and not only of reference: 
The historical chain preserves the linguistic meaning of any 
expression. In the case of names, all there is to this meaning is to 
stand for the given referent. Ergo, the chain preserves the fact that 
the name stands for that referent. (Almog 1984, 482) 
If Almog is right, an externalist meta-semantic story can be told about 
linguistic meaning in general, both in case of typical referential 
expressions, as well as for other expressions. 
Keith Donnellan (1993, 155) argues that in characterizing externalism it 
is important to distinguish two theses that are both proposed Putnam’s 
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975). One of them might be called 
“physical externalism” (as in Wikforss 2008), and it concerns the 
semantics of natural kind terms. This is the thesis that the extension of 
such terms is set by the underlying nature of a set of paradigmatic 
instances of that natural kind. The rule for the use of the term sets the 
paradigmatic instances of that kind (e.g., water), and sets as extension 
anything that has the same internal structure as the paradigm instances, 
but does not identify the properties that form the underlying nature of 
these paradigmatic instances (e.g., having the chemical structure H2O). 
The latter might be, and usually is, unknown to the speaker, and even to 
the whole linguistic community. 
A second thesis that is to be found in Putnam (1975, 228) might be called 
“social externalism”. Putnam formulates it as the Hypothesis of the 
Universal Division of Linguistic Labour:  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Every linguistic community… possesses at least some terms whose 
associated ‘criteria’ are known only to a subset of the speakers who 
acquire the terms and whose use by the other speakers depends 
upon a structured cooperation between them and the speakers in 
the relevant subsets. (1975, 228) 
Not all members of a linguistic community possess all the criteria for the 
correct use of all the words. There are those members whom Putnam calls 
“experts” (1975, 228), who do have the capacity to discriminate instances 
of, say, water, from those that are not. Putnam writes: “the way of 
recognizing possessed by these ‘expert’ speakers is also, through them, 
possessed by the collective linguistic body, even though it is not 
possessed by each individual member of the body” (1975, 228). If 
‘arthritis’ has a meaning in the linguistic community then, in accordance 
to Putnam’s Hypothesis, some users must have good recognitional 
capacities of the instances of that kind that are presented to them in 
normal conditions. This is the case not only for natural kind terms, but 
also for words that refer, for instance, to artifacts, such as ‘carburetor’, 
Donnellan (1993, 162) notes. Although I might lack the capacity to 
discriminate carburetors from similar devices, the mechanic does possess 
this capacity, and, in virtue of this, the word has a meaning in the 
linguistic community. The individuation of meaning includes factors that 
are external to the speaker, and concern the existence of a linguistic 
practice of using that expression in the speaker’s linguistic community. 
As Donnellan (1993, 162) explains, this idea is similar to Burge’s (1979) 
“anti-individualism” and his claim that it is the linguistic community that 
provides the standard by which the speaker’s mastery of a word is to be 
judged. According to Burge, the conventional linguistic meaning “may 
vary with the individual’s environment, even as the individual’s activities, 
individualistically and nonintentionally specified, are held 
constant” (Burge 1986, 273). The relevant environment includes the 
linguistic community to which the speaker belongs.  1
The distinction between the physical and the social varieties of 
externalism has parallels in what concerns linguistic competence. 
Concerning the former, competence with proper names and natural kind 
terms does not require access to facts about the physical constitution of 
the individual or kind in question. The speaker needs not possess a 
uniquely identifying description of the essential properties of the 
referents. Similarly, social externalism supports the idea that an 
individual can achieve competence in using an expression even if she  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does not have access to a correct description of the relevant social facts 
on which the meaning of the expression depends. The speaker needs not 
know when or where the initial baptism took place, or how exactly the 
word was introduced in the language, and she needs not know much 
about the chain that connects her causally to that initial moment. Social 
externalism also entails that the competent user of an expression needs 
not be able to provide a uniquely identifying description of the linguistic 
practice, i.e., an account of the semantic rules that members of the 
relevant social community follow. As Burge puts it, speakers need not 
have the ability to offer a correct “explication” of the meaning of the 
words. A speaker’s explication of meaning, or “what the individual would 
give, under some reflection, as his understanding of the word” (1989, 
282), may be far from correct. Possessing the information needed for 
perfect mastery of the word is not required for meaningful use of a word 
(although a minimum of knowledge is, arguably, required, as we will see 
later). In other words, in order for a speaker’s utterance of a word-form  2
to have the linguistic meaning that it has in the relevant linguistic 
community (that is, to be a word with that form) the speaker needs not 
have access to a complete characterization of the correct use of the 
expression. !
2. The notion of deference !
The thesis that semantic competence with proper names and natural kind 
terms does not require uniquely identifying descriptive knowledge of 
either the extension or the correct use does not yet tell us what 
competence does require. According to the standard externalist view, at 
least one condition must be fulfilled: the speaker must defer to the 
linguistic community for the meaning of the word. In relation to the 
notion of deference, it is important to distinguish, following Donnellan 
(1993, 163), semantic deference, which consists in relying on the 
linguistic community (in particular, on the “experts”, in Putnam’s sense 
of the word) for the exact meaning of a particular word from epistemic 
deference, which consists in deferring to a particular specialist, or to a 
community of experts (in the more usual sense of the term “expert”) for 
the justification of a particular claim. Given that I have an incomplete 
mastery of the word ‘arthritis’, I defer semantically to the community of 
medical experts for the exact sense and correct use of the term. On the 
other hand, in uttering the sentence ‘I do not have arthritis’ I may defer, 
epistemically this time, to the physician that gave me this diagnosis, as I 
lack direct evidence in favour of this claim. If the physician is wrong 
about my condition my utterance is false, but still meaningful, in virtue of  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having semantically deferred for the meaning of the word. 
In order to use the word with its customary meaning, the speaker must 
rely on the community of competent speakers that engage in the linguistic 
practice on which the meaning of the expression depends. In order to do 
so, he must form a particular intention, which Kripke characterizes as 
follows: “When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the 
name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same 
reference as the man from whom he heard it.” (Kripke 1980, 96)  Given 3
that, as Burge (1979) puts it, it is the linguistic community that possesses 
the standards by which the speaker’s mastery of a word is to be judge, 
semantic deference also requires the disposition to stand corrected in face 
of criticism coming from those he recognizes as having a better mastery 
of the word. 
But is it sufficient to intend to use the word correctly, and to have the 
disposition to stand corrected? Semantic deference, at least in some 
formulations of it, requires more than the mere intention to use the word 
correctly. Kripke’s formulation of the condition in the passage quoted 
presupposes that the speaker be aware of the semantic function that the 
expression serves in the language, i.e. that he be able to correctly identify 
the expression as a proper name, or at least as a singular referential 
expression. Otherwise he cannot “intend when he learns it to use it with 
the same reference as the man from whom he heard it.” (Kripke 1980, 96; 
emphasis added) Scott Soames mentions such a requirement on 
competence with proper names explicitly: 
In order to be a user of a name n of an object o, two things are 
required. (i) One must have acquired a referential intention that 
determines o as the referent of n. […] (ii) One must realize that to 
assertively utter n is F is to say of the referent, o, of n that it ‘is F’. 
(2002, 65) 
For linguistic competence with names one must, apart from having the 
right deferential intention when using n, realize that n is a singular 
referential expressions.  4
According to Putnam (1975), these conditions are sufficient for 
competence with proper names, but not for natural kind terms. He writes:  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we don’t assign the standard extension to the tokens of a word W 
uttered by Jones no matter how Jones uses W… One can use the 
proper name ‘Sanders’ correctly without knowing anything about 
the referent except that he is called ‘Sanders’ – and even that may 
not be correct... But one cannot use the word tiger correctly, save 
per accidens, without knowing a good deal about tigers, or at least 
about a certain conception of tigers. (1975, 246-7)  5
Putnam (1975) proposes that the speaker must also associate with the 
natural kind term a minimum set of descriptive information, which he 
calls “stereotypes”.  Stereotypes, he writes, are “conventional ideas, 6
which may be inaccurate” (1975, 249), and which have come to be 
associated with the kind term due to a variety of historical contingencies. 
These are claims commonly held to be true about the instances that 
belong to a specific natural kind, but which are not analytically true, and 
might not even be true at all. Although they include criteria for 
recognizing if a thing belongs to the kind, they need not include the best 
criteria that the community has, or the criteria that the experts use to 
recognize typical members of the class. In our culture, Putnam (1975, 
230) writes, the stereotype for ‘elm’ might just be that it is a common 
deciduous tree, and that for ‘molybdenum’ might be that it is a metal. 
In the above passage Putnam mentions knowledge of stereotypes as a 
requirement on correct use of the word. Later on he writes that this is also 
a requirement on word acquisition: 
We shall speak of someone as having acquired the word ‘tiger’ if 
he is able to use it in such a way that (1) his use passes muster (i.e. 
people don’t say of him such things as ‘he doesn’t know what a 
tiger is’, ‘he doesn’t know the meaning of the word “tiger”’, etc.); 
and (2) his total way of being situated in the world and in his 
linguistic community is such that the socially determined extension 
of the word ‘tiger’ in his idiolect is the set of tigers. (1975, 247) 
In order for one’s use of ‘tiger’ to mean tiger, i.e. for one to acquire the 
word ‘tiger’, one must (2) rely on the linguistic community for the 
meaning of the word, but also (1) count as “knowing the meaning” of the 
word. For (1) to be fulfilled, one must conform at least minimally to the 
correct practice of using the word. That requires a minimal level of 
knowledge about how people use the word ‘tiger’, which, in turn, 
requires knowledge of the associated stereotypes. If one lacks this know-  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-ledge, then the intention does not guarantee success in word acquisition, 
that is, in using the word with the meaning it has in the community. 
Although Putnam does not put it in these terms, one could express this 
condition by saying that the intention to defer is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for successful deference. Only if the speaker also 
knows the stereotypes associated with the natural kind term she 
successfully defers to the linguistic community for the meaning of the 
word.  7
According to Putnam’s argument, as I understand it, knowledge of 
stereotypes is a requirement for minimally correct use of the word, and 
the latter is a requirement on word acquisition, i.e. successful deference. 
Let us focus on the last step of Putnam’s argument. Why is correct use a 
requirement on successful deference? I find no answer to this question in 
Putnam’s discussion of stereotypes, but a plausible one might be that a 
minimal level of mastery is itself needed for the possibility of rational 
interpretation of one’s utterances, and the latter is required for successful 
attribution of meaning to the word-forms one utters. So, the justification 
of the condition concerning knowledge of stereotypes rests on the 
consideration of certain requirements on the general form of a theory of 
interpretation of linguistic behaviour. As Mark Platts (1997) writes: 
The aim of a theory of interpretation is to make sense of a person’s 
linguistic behaviour as part of making sense of him. The constraint 
upon any such theory is that it makes sense to say of the person 
that he was then and there saying what our theory represents him 
as saying. (1997, 288)  
Applied to semantic interpretation, this is the following principle: if we 
are not disposed to attribute to the speaker the speech act of having 
literally said what the word-forms literally mean within the linguistic 
community to which the speaker is intending to defer then deference is 
unsuccessful, and the word-forms fail to obtain that literal meaning. Such 
a case obtains when the speaker’s ignorance of the correct rules of 
application of the terms is manifest. So, minimally correct use is a 
requirement on successful deference because it is a requirement on 
semantic interpretation, i.e. ascription of literal meaning to the speaker’s 
utterance. If the speaker has no idea how to apply the word ‘tiger’ we will 
refrain from interpreting her as making assertions about tigers, and so as 
using ‘tiger’ with its customary meaning. 
Let us consider a concrete example to illustrate this claim. Suppose J is a 
student of English at beginner level, and completely lacks knowledge of  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the associated stereotypes for any of the expression-forms he is 
pronouncing and spelling. He is merely repeating words he has just heard 
and which he assumes to be meaningful in English when uttering ‘I have 
seen tigers in the street today’. It would be incorrect, or at least 
misleading, to say that J is literally talking about tigers, even if he does 
have the intention to use the words with the standard meaning. As a 
result, semantic interpretation cannot proceed, and the sounds he made 
cannot be counted as meaningful tokens of the language he intends to 
speak. A child in the early stages of language acquisition, who imitates 
the sounds she hears, provides a similar example. 
Another case relevant to our purposes is one that Burge (1979) discusses, 
involving a grossly nonstandard use of ‘orangutan’.  He writes (1979, 8
191-120): “If a generally competent and reasonable speaker thinks that 
‘orangutan’ applies to a fruit drink, we would be reluctant, and it would 
unquestionably be misleading, to take his words as revealing that he 
thinks he has been drinking orangutans for breakfast for the last few 
weeks.” It would also be misleading to take him as having asserted (or 
said) that about orangutans. This case is different from the previous one 
in that now the speaker does have an identifiable communicative 
intention (e.g., he has orange juice in mind all the time when he uses the 
word-form ‘orangutan’), and so we can retrieve a speaker meaning. We 
can make sense of his linguistic behaviour, and attribute to him the 
intention to say that he has been drinking orange juice for breakfast, but 
not the speech act of having literally said so. It was not orangutans that 
she was talking about. Whenever the use is systematically and grossly 
non-standard we count the speaker as having failed to say anything that 
might be judged literally true or false.  9
Cases such as the above show that the intention to participate in a 
practice does not suffice; when the speaker’s use of the word radically 
departs from standard use the intention to defer is frustrated. To use a 
common analogy, one can play a game even if one does not know all the 
rules and all the definitions of technical notions (i.e. one does not have 
perfect mastery of the game); but one cannot play a game if one believes 
the rules of the game are very different from what they actually are. And 
the same applies to a ‘language game’. So, the speaker who 
systematically uses ‘orangutan’ in non-standard ways cannot count as 
playing the same language game the members of the community to which 
she intends to defer play. The deferential intention to play the language 
games of words such as ‘tiger’ and ‘orangutan’ is not sufficient.  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The language game analogy suggests that in order to use a word with its 
customary meaning some minimal level of familiarity with the basic rules 
of the language game is needed. But what is this level, and what are these 
basic rules? The English student example suggests that one cannot defer 
if one lacks knowledge even of the semantic properties of the word (e.g., 
being a common noun, in this case).  The ‘orangutan’ example suggests 10
that one cannot defer if one has false believes about what the stereotypes 
are. But what if one identifies the semantic category of the expression, 
does not have false belief about stereotypes, but still does not have 
knowledge of the associated stereotypes? Would that allow for successful 
deference? Suppose I am a fluent speaker of English who has never heard 
the word ‘carburetor’ before. Does my utterance of it have the customary 
meaning when I ask what a carburetor is? Intuitively it might seems so, 
and it that case, whatever successful deference requires, it does not 
require any knowledge of stereotypes.  11
However, there are good reasons to resist this conclusion. There is, 
indeed, a sense in which I use the word ‘carburetor’ even if I lack any 
knowledge about what the word stands for, and I am completely 
unfamiliar with how others use it. In the same sense, one might count as 
playing badminton when one is merely practicing the movement of the 
hand in hitting the shuttlecock as part of the learning process, even when 
one knows nothing else about badminton. But those are very loose senses 
of “using” the word and “playing” the game, respectively. The sentences 
in which I am disposed to use 'carburetor' are mainly questions about how 
the word should be used or what it means. I am aware that if venture to 
use it in other contexts I run the risk of using it in radically nonstandard 
ways, as our speaker in the ‘orangutan’ case does. Deference is 
unsuccessful in that case because use is radically nonstandard. Deference 
is unsuccessful here because use reduces to very little.  12
To sum up, the speaker’s expression-forms acquire meaning from a pre-
existing linguistic practice only if the speaker participates in that 
linguistic practice, and so, only if she uses the expression-form in mini-  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be that of language as a tool: a word has a meaning when I utter it in the same way in 
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lacks any syntactic or semantic knowledge of the use of the words she is pronouncing, 
would still defer successfully. If she does not it means the language game analogy is a 
better one.
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Andrei’, ‘Andrei’ is mentioned and not used.
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-mal accordance with the rules of that linguistic practice. A minimum is 
required in terms of knowledge of the semantic rules that govern the use 
of that expression, and, in turn, this requires acquaintance with the 
associated stereotypes. As Putnam comments, 
This idea should not seem too surprising. After all, we do not 
permit people to drive on the highways without first passing some 
tests to determine that they have a minimum level of 
competence… The linguistic community too has its minimum 
standards, with respect both to syntax and to ‘semantics’. (1975, 
248-249) !
3. Discussion: what is consumerist semantics exactly? !
In what follows I explore a couple of consequences that Putnam’s 
requirement on deference has with respect to closely related issues within 
the externalist picture of meaning. A direct consequence concerns the 
general formulation of the externalist view of meaning and meaning 
acquisition, sometimes called “consumerist semantics”. Almog (1984), in 
the passage quoted at the beginning, notes that Kripke’s account of 
initiation into the use of a proper name is an instance of a more general 
principle that is not concerned only with the preservation of reference, 
but also with the preservation of meaning in general. Kaplan (1989), who 
calls this view “Consumerism”, offers the following formulation of it: 
we are, for the most part, language consumers. Words come to us 
prepackaged with a semantic value. If we are to use those words, 
the words we have received, the words of our linguistic 
community, then we must defer to their meaning. Otherwise we 
play the role of language creators. (Kaplan 1989, 602) 
It is useful to distinguish, following Kaplan (1989), between a producer/
creator and a consumer. Acquiring competence as a consumer is a very 
different business from acquiring competence as a producer. A consumer 
of a pre-existing meaning of a word in a language is someone who 
successfully defers for the meaning of that word to the respective 
linguistic community. In contrast to a consumer, a producer is someone 
who does not rely on a pre-existing linguistic practice, but introduces a 
new word in the language. 
Gareth Evans (1982) also uses the consumer-producer dichotomy.  The 13
fact that “individual speakers exploit general practices” (1982, 387), he 
writes, is true of many other semantic properties besides that of referring  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and transmitting the reference of a referential term. He formulates the 
following “general principle” for being a consumer: 
if a speaker uses a word with the manifest intention to participate 
in such-and-such a practice, in which the word is used with such 
and such semantic properties, then the word, as used by him, will 
possess just those semantic properties. This principle has as much 
application to the use by speakers of words like ‘agronomist’, 
‘monetarism’ and the like as to their use of proper names. (Evans 
1982, 387) 
Notice that, while Kaplan states a necessary condition, Evans formulates 
his “general principle” as a sufficient condition for one’s use of an 
expression-form to have the linguistic meaning it has in a certain 
linguistic practice. So do other authors, such as, for instance, Adèle 
Mercier, who writes: 
Consumerism is the view that, so long as language users intend to 
defer to the linguistic community in matters of usage, their idiolect 
and the meanings of their words are individuated by reference to 
that community. (Mercier 1994, 500) 
According to both Evans and Mercier, the intention (or the “manifest 
intention”, as Evans puts it) to defer to a particular linguistic community 
is sufficient for successful deference. But if Putnam is right about natural 
kind terms, then there are reasons to doubt of Evans’ and Mercier’s 
formulation of Consumerism. Having the manifest intention to participate 
in the relevant linguistic practice of using an expression with a certain 
meaning is arguably not sufficient for one’s utterance of that expression 
to have that meaning. A condition concerning knowledge of stereotypes 
must also be fulfilled. !
4. Discussion: non-intentional deference? 
Is having an intention to defer a necessary condition for successful 
deference? Although the authors discussed so far seem to think so, others 
have argued that it is not. In their paper “Deferential Utterances” (2005) 
Stojanovic et al. introduce a series of useful distinctions between 
different kinds of semantic deference followed by a number of interesting 
comments. The authors make an attempt to mitigate between Andrew 
Woodfield’s claim that deferring is an “intentional act, done by a person 
for a reason” (Woodfield 2000, 449-450) and François Recanati’s (2000) 
claim that we implicitly defer for most terms that we use in utterances, 
without this being always an intentional act. Recanati postulates the 
existence of a “deferential operator”, which is an unarticulated 
constituent that affects the contribution to truth-conditions of any word 
that we use and for which we are not experts, that is, lack perfect mastery. 
According to Recanati (2000, 282), this is usually deference that we are 
not aware of and which is not intentional. In order to do justice to the two  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perspectives, Stojanovic et al. (2005) introduce a distinction between 
“default deference” and “deliberate deference”. The former is the kind of 
deference that Recanati (2000) seems to have had in mind (leaving aside 
his claim about the existence of an unarticulated constituent, to which the 
authors do not subscribe), while the latter is the kind of deference that 
Woodfield (2000) had in mind. They write that “default deference usually 
goes unnoticed by speaker and hearer”, while “[a] speaker who defers 
deliberately must intend to do so, and her intention must be recognized 
by her interlocutors.” (Stojanovic et al. 2005, 4) Deliberate deference is 
characterized by the intention to use an expression in the way in which it 
is used in some dialect, sociolect or idiolect. A simple example of 
deliberate deference into a common language that they discuss is the 
following sentence: “Barthes described the book as “un choc historique” 
and “un repère nouveau et un départ pour l’écriture”.” (Stojanovic et al. 
2005, 20) The authors comment that the language-shift into French is 
deliberate, a fact that is exhibited by the contextual features employed to 
mark the shift, in this case, quotation (but also special intonation or 
metalinguistic comments in other cases). The authors show that deliberate 
deference might be to a sociolect (e.g., the way a certain word is used in a 
particular community) or idiolect (e.g., the peculiar way someone uses a 
certain word). 
In what follows I leave aside what the authors call ‘deliberate deference’ 
and focus on what they call ‘default deference’. In contrast to deliberate 
deference, default deference is ubiquitous, as it “is involved in every 
communicative act. When interpreting and evaluating an utterance, we 
must take into account a language parameter.” (Stojanovic et al. 2005, 6) 
Usually, default deference is deference to one’s own linguistic 
community, while deliberate deference usually involves a language-shift. 
But, as in the case of deliberate deference, not all default deference is 
deference to a language: it might be deference to a sociolect (e.g., the 
technical definition of ‘walk’ in the official regulation of race walking), 
or even someone’s idiolect. What distinguishes deliberate from default 
deference is that in the case of the latter no special recourse is made to 
contextual features in order to make salient the linguistic parameter. In 
contrast, with deliberate deference the speaker “exploits certain 
contextual features in order to make salient the linguistic parameter” for 
the interpretation of her utterance, and “wants her exploitation of 
contextual resources to be recognized as part of her communicative 
intentions by the audience” (Stojanovic et al. 2005, 20). 
The authors also claim that default deference usually involves no 
intention to defer, as opposed to deliberate deference, which does: “a 
speaker who is deferring deliberately must be aware of what she is doing” 
(Stojanovic et al. 2005, 6). Default deference usually passes unnoticed by 
both speaker and hearer. However, they add, the existence or inexistence 
of a conscious intention to defer is not criterial in making the distinction  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between the two kinds of deference: 
this does not make the default/deliberate distinction collapse into 
the self-conscious/unconscious distinction, for in the case of 
default deference, too, the speaker may be perfectly aware of the 
fact that she is deferring by default. (2005, 6-7) 
Instead, it is the appeal to contextual factors in conveying what language, 
sociolect or idiolect the speaker is deferring to that is criterial in making 
the distinction. Such appeals characterize deliberate deference and lack in 
cases of default deference. 
Let us focus on the authors’ remark that “[a] speaker who defers by 
default most often does not have the intention to defer.” (Stojanovic et al. 
2005, 4) Is it possible to defer semantically without a specific intention to 
do so? The claim that it is contradicts the standard view on what 
deference requires. Kripke, we have seen, writes that “[w]hen the name is 
‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend 
when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom 
he heard it.” (Kripke 1980, 96) Others, such as Evans (1982) and Mercier 
(1995) take such an intention to be not only necessary, but also sufficient. 
Contrary to Stojanovic et al. (2005), I think that deference is always 
intentional. The argument that I present in what follows is suggested by 
the above discussion of Putnam’s approach. If successful deference 
requires knowledge of stereotypes, then we need to distinguish between 
successful and failed deference. Cases such as the ones discussed above 
in the section on stereotypes help to make this point. In Burge’s (1979) 
example the speaker uses ‘orangutan’ to speaker-mean orange, but she 
uses it in ways that are sufficiently nonstandard so as to provide us with a 
clear example of failed deference. The reason why she uses it non-
standardly is that she is confused about the meaning of the word, and 
associates the wrong stereotypes to the word. However, intuitively we 
would say that the speaker intends to use ‘orangutan’ as it is used in 
English. The problem is that he lacks the necessary knowledge 
concerning how the word is to be used in English. As a result, we cannot 
grant that the word in his mouth means orangutan. In order to 
characterize what is going on in such a case we need to talk about 
intentions to defer that do not achieve their aim. When deference is not 
successful we are left with is a failed attempt to defer. In general, in all 
cases in which the goal of an action is not achieved there is a need to 
distinguish between attempt and achievement. 
In Burge’s example, failure is due to the fact that the speaker associates 
the wrong stereotypes to the word. In other cases, failure of deference 
might not involve stereotypes at all. Suppose the word-form the speaker 
uses does not exist at all in the source language. Imagine a non-native 
speaker of a language who is led to believe that ‘clorange’ is the generic 
name of soda drink that tastes like orange but does not contain orange  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juice. The speaker believes the word exists in English and uses it with the 
meaning she believes it has. But deference is, of course, unsuccessful. 
There is no question here of whether the speaker associates the right 
stereotypes with the word, given that ‘clorange’ is not a word, and so a 
fortiori it has no associated stereotypes. Even if we can retrieve a speaker 
meaning once we realize the communicative intention with which the 
speaker uses the word, this is a case in which the speaker forms an 
intention to defer but deference is unsuccessful. 
A third kind of cases of failed deference is identified in Cappelen (2013a, 
59; 2013b). The author proposes a strategy for identifying nonsensical 
uses of expressions generated by a failure of deference. He applies this 
strategy of diagnosis in order to argue that the use of the notion of 
‘intuition’ in contemporary philosophy is confused and nonsensical. 
Cappelen’s proposal is that there is evidence for a potentially meaningless 
use of an expression E if that use satisfies the following three conditions: 
(i) The speaker is a member of a number of distinct 
subcommunities in which E is used in significantly different ways; 
(ii) The speaker is unaware of (i); and (iii) The speaker defers to 
the use it has in ‘the community’ without any particular 
subcommunity in mind and with (broadly speaking) causal 
connection to a multiplicity of communities. (2013a, 39) 
Independently of whether Cappelen’s case for the meaninglessness of the 
philosophical use of ‘intuition’ is successful or not, Cappelen does 
identify a particular strategy for generating failures of deference. One 
example less controversial than that of a philosopher’s use of ‘intuition’ 
could be the use of ‘liberal’ in some contexts of political debate. Consider 
a speaker who utters: ‘When it comes to same-sex marriage I am a 
liberal.’ Now suppose the speaker is insufficiently familiarized with the 
differences between the political terminologies on the two sides of the 
Atlantic, and, at the same time, has causal connections to both linguistic 
communities. She fails to realize that those who identify as ‘liberals’ in 
Europe tend to have more conservative views on the issue, while those 
who identify as ‘liberals’ in the U.S. tend to be more open. Even if we 
could retrieve a speaker meaning, it is doubtful that the sentence uttered 
has identifiable truth-conditions. The case is, rather, one in which the 
speaker fails to defer properly for the meaning of ‘liberal’. The problem, 
as in the previous case, is not with the condition on stereotypes, but with 
the condition on the deferential intention, which is not correctly formed. 
However, intuitively we would say that the speaker does have an 
intention to defer, even if it is, in some sense, incorrect. This case is best 
described by saying that the speaker has the intention to mean by ‘liberal’ 
whatever experts in political theory ‘in the community’ mean by the 
word. The intention is incorrect because it falsely presupposes that there 
is a unique community and a unique use of the word in political contexts, 
when in fact, there are various.  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The above cases show that we sometimes need to postulate an intention 
to defer when deference is unsuccessful. For parity of reasons, it is 
natural to think of deference as intentional also in those cases in which it 
is successful. This is exactly how Kripke (1980), Evans (1982), Mercier 
(1994), Soames (2002), among the authors quoted above, conceive of it. 
Of course, this is not to say that the speaker always forms a conscious 
intention to defer to a linguistic community. The actual process might 
often be readily characterized as unconscious, habitual, and automatic. It 
usually does not have the phenomenological features of conscious 
control. Nevertheless, it is still rational, and apt to receive a personal-
level explanation in terms of attribution of propositional attitudes such as 
intentions. David Lewis (1975) makes this point with respect to action in 
general: 
An action may be rational, and may be explained by the agent’s 
beliefs and desires, even though that action was done by habit, and 
the agent gave no thought to the beliefs or desires which were his 
reason for acting. A habit may be under the agent’s rational 
control… (1975, 25-26) 
To sum up, we have seen several cases that we can best make sense of by 
attributing to the speaker an unsuccessful intention to defer.  Endowing 14
an expression-form with meaning through deference is not a feature of an 
utterance of that expression-form that is obtained by default (in contrast 
to, for instance, causing a movement of particles: one cannot utter a word 
without implicitly causing the particles in the air or in some other 
environment to move). Instead, it requires that certain conditions be 
satisfied. It often requires choosing the language, sociolect or idiolect to 
which one defers, and any choice is intentional. For similar reasons, the 
correct interpretation of an utterance of an ambiguous word depends on 
what intention it is reasonable to attribute to the speaker in using the 
word-form in that context. And the same applies to proper names: here 
the speaker is not only required to defer to the source language, but also 
to choose a particular naming-practice (i.e., the use of the name to refer to 
a particular individual) out of the various ones that the name-form has.  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 An anonymous reviewer insists that the claim that deference can be both intentional and 14
unconscious is not a prima facie intuitive one, so it requires some elucidation. However, I 
do not find the claim unintuitive at all. There are many examples of actions that are done 
without the full conscious of the presence of a clear formulated intention, but are best 
interpreted as performed with an intention. Walking home on a familiar route or grabbing 
your keys when leaving the house are such examples. !
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